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1 Introduction
Commentary on the recent period of recession has frequently emphasised its global nature
and the role of con¯dence in propagating and possibly prolonging the real e®ects of the
¯nancial crisis. The potential in°uence of cross-country interactions in output dynamics
is obvious given the e®ects of cross-border trade and foreign direct investment, the impor-
tance of international supply chains, the mobility of capital in ¯nancial markets, and so
on. The role assigned to con¯dence is less clear; sometimes commentators appear to use
the phrase to convey agents' hopes and anxieties on the future prospects of the underlying
fundamentals at home and abroad; sometimes the phrase relates to agents' reaction to
risk/ambiguity/uncertainty over the fundamentals; and sometimes the phrase suggests a
more autonomous role in which agents' beliefs have an e®ect on economic activity sepa-
rately to the fundamentals. In what follows, we shall describe this latter role as the e®ect
of `sentiment'.
This paper introduces new measures to quantify the extent to which countries' out-
put movements are in°uenced by the globalised nature of trade and ¯nancial linkages, by
news on future prospects versus uncertainty about these prospects and by autonomous
movements in sentiment versus fundamentals. The measures are based on a reduced-form
VAR model of countries' actual output series, their expected output series as reported
in surveys and the uncertainty surrounding the expected series. The multi-country VAR
framework is able to capture the complex interactions between countries' outputs in a
parsimonious and transparent way and allows us to quantify the importance of the in-
teractions arising through countries' actual trade and investment activities and through
cross-border reactions to countries' planned outputs. The use of survey measures of ex-
pected outputs also makes possible an analysis of the e®ects of agents' beliefs about output
movements including the role of optimism/pessimism over future economic prospects (re-
°ected in the average responses to the survey) and the role of the uncertainty surrounding
these (re°ected by the extent of disagreement across survey respondents). This analysis
is not possible using actual output only and allows us to conduct a VAR-based test of the
rationality of expectations - taking into account the potential for information rigidities -
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and hence to distinguish and quantify the e®ect of beliefs about fundamentals from the
autonomous role played by sentiment in countries' output dynamics.
The new measures are used in the paper in an analysis of output movements in the G7
economies over the last twenty years. The underlying VAR model is constructed using the
`Global VAR' [GVAR] framework elaborated in, inter alia, Pesaran et al. (2004), Garratt
et al. (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2016). For the global-versus-national analysis,
we can compare our results with those in the literature investigating similar questions
using di®erent methods; for example, papers by Kose et al. (2003, 2008) and Crucini et
al. (2011), among others, who employed dynamic common factor models to evaluate the
relative importance of a global factor in driving countries' output growths.1 Crucini et
al. (2011)'s results are typical, ¯nding that a global factor accounts for around 46% of
output variation in the G7 during 1960-2007 although there is considerable variability in its
in°uence across countries (ranging from 80% in France to 15% in the US, for example). As
we shall see, our results on the global-versus-national split are broadly similar, providing
some reassurance that our methods, which rely on output data only, deliver reasonable
measures.
Our use of survey data allows an analysis of the role of time-varying uncertainty on
business cycle °uctuations as well as that played by optimism/pessimism over future eco-
nomic prospects. Future prospects are captured by the average of the survey responses at
each time while uncertainty can be measured by the disagreement across survey respon-
dents. The interaction of uncertainty with adjustment costs in investment and hiring, the
reaction of ¯nancial markets to risk, and decision-makers' aversion to ambiguity provide
many potential routes by which uncertainty might in°uence output dynamics,2 some-
times focusing on uncertainty as a cause of recession and sometimes seeing uncertainty
as a vehicle for prolonging the e®ects of other recessionary shocks. Recent empirical evi-
dence suggests uncertainty plays a major role in output dynamics3. But these results rely
1The common factor approach typically uses data on countries' outputs and components of aggregate
demand to measure the e®ects of global shocks, national shocks and component-speci¯c shocks.
2See the discussions in Bloom et al. (2012), Fern¶andez-Villaverde,et al. (2011), or Ilut and Schneider
(2012), for example.
3For example, Ilut and Schneider (2014) assign around 40% of US business cycle movements to con-
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on potentially contentious identifying assumptions some of which are mitigated in our
analysis by our focus on output data and our explicit modelling of output expectations
alongside uncertainty. Further, much of the commentary on the global recession following
the Financial Crisis of 2008 suggests an important international dimension in the role of
uncertainty in business cycle °uctuations,4 and our analysis of cross-country interactions
can provide important insights on this.
The paper's measure of the relative importance of fundamentals-versus-sentiment is, as
far as we know, the ¯rst of its type in the literature. We assume that output movements
and variations in uncertainty that are driven by fundamentals will be consistent with
rationality in expectations formation, with the rest labeled as being driven by `sentiment'.
Output movements and variations in uncertainty due to fundamentals can include those
associated with `information rigidities' where agents form rational expectations (RE) but
are either slow to make use of publicly available information (`sticky information RE') or
observe fundamentals only with error (`noisy information RE'), as described in Mankiw
and Reis (2002) and Sims (2003), for example. We assume that output °uctuations or
changes in uncertainty driven by fear, concern for fairness or other psychological factors are
inconsistent with RE and operate independently of underlying economic fundamentals.5
The renewed interest in the role of agents' beliefs in output dynamics has generated
an empirical literature which examines the nature of information rigidities through the
¯dence shocks; an uncertainty measure accounts for around one third of the forecast error variance of
US production at a three-year horizonin in Bachmann et al. (2011); Bloom et al. (2012) argue that a
reasonably calibrated uncertainty shock would result in a short-lived but substantial fall in output, by
around 3%, in their DSGE model of the US; and Baker at al. (2016) estimate peak reductions of around
1% in industrial production across a number of countries in response to shocks to uncertainty of the size
typically observed in recent years.
4See, for example, Kannan et al. (2009) on the role of coordination failures across borders in inhibiting
export and credit growth and in postponing investment decisions, or Kose and Terrones' (2015) discussion
of global recessions.
5These in°uences are discussed in Akerlof and Shiller's in°uential (2009) text, for example, and are
often described as `animal spirits'.
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use of forecasters' survey responses6 or which uses stock price data, direct measures of
con¯dence and other forward-looking series to distinguish the e®ects on output of news
on fundamentals from those of sentiment.7 Our use of survey data in this paper is in
the same spirit as this recent empirical work but adds to the literature by testing the
rationality of expectations formation in the presence of information rigidities in a VAR
context and by quantifying in a novel variance decomposition the separate contribution
of fundamentals and sentiment to persistent movements in output in the G7 countries.8
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our modelling
framework, explaining how our national models of actual and expected output growths
and uncertainty are developed and brought together in the GVAR framework. We also
explain how assumptions on information rigidities can be tested and accommodated in
our model and describe the decompositions that we can use to distinguish global from
national e®ects, the role of uncertainty, and the e®ect of fundamentals versus sentiment in
output dynamics. Section 3 describes the VAR model obtained for the G7 economies over
the period 1994q1-2014q2 and presents the results of the decomposition analysis. As we
shall see, the results show cross-country in°uences to be as important in understanding
G7 output movements as national ones, although there are considerable di®erences across
countries, echoing the ¯ndings in the common factor literature. We ¯nd that an important
element of the cross-country interactions comes through uncertainty about other countries'
prospects although the role of uncertainty appears to prolong the e®ects of shocks rather
than to provide a major source of shocks. Perhaps most controversially, we also ¯nd that
the restrictions implied by assumptions of RE in the presence of information rigidities are
rejected and that, although fundamentals do dominate in explaining persistent movements
in output, the e®ects of sentiment are non-negligible, contributing around 20% of the
permanent e®ects of shocks to a country's output on average. Section 4 provides some
6See, for example, Andrade and Le Bihan (2013), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, 2012) and Dovern
et al (2012, 2015).
7See, for example, Beaudry and Portier (2006), Barsky and Sims (2011, 2012) and Bachmann and
Sims (2012).
8The use of direct measures of expectations to uncover the role of beliefs and the nature of expectation
formation is also a well researched ¯eld; see, for example, Croushore (2010) for an overview.
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concluding comments.
2 Modelling Output in a Global Economy
2.1 The Modelling Framework
An analysis that focuses on the role of agents' beliefs in output °uctuations has to pay
careful attention to the information that is available to agents in real time. This means,
for example, that the measures of actual output should account for the fact that output
data is typically published with a lag of one quarter and, in practice, agents' perceptions
of current output levels and expected future output levels can only be obtained from
surveys.9 In what follows, we denote (the logarithm of) output at time  by  and the
measure of  published in time  +  by +. If  = 1, the measure is from an o±cial
publication published after the one quarter publication delay. If  6 0, the measure is a
direct measure of expectations on  as published in  +  (and the point is emphasised
by a superscript `e'). In practice, the expectation measure of 

 , say, is the mean of the
nowcasts of  calculated across a number of forecasters surveyed at  and so a measure
of the uncertainty over the state of the economy is also provided by the disagreement
between respondents over the nowcast at that time.10 We denote this uncertainty by 


and measure it in practice by the inter-quartile range of the survey respondents' nowcasts.
Considering just one country in isolation for the time being, and focusing on the
case where only contemporaneous and one-period-ahead expectations are used, output
9The ¯rst-release data is also often revised. As we explain below, in what follows, we do not model
the revisions process, e®ectively assuming that revisions simply constitute noise.
10Of course, more variability in individuals' subjective density forecasts also consitutes greater un-
certainty and should be taken into account where available. However, as discussed in Bachmann et al
(2011) and Dovern et al. (2012, 2015), inter alia, the disagreement measure serves as a useful proxy for
uncertainty in many circumstances and is often the best measure avaliable.
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dynamics can be characterised by the model26666664
¡1 ¡ ¡1¡2


 ¡ ¡1


+1 ¡ 



37777775 = ¡0 +
X
=1
¡
26666664
¡¡1¡ ¡ ¡1¡¡2¡
¡¡ ¡ ¡¡1¡
¡+1¡ ¡ ¡¡
¡¡
37777775+
26666664
1
2
3
4
37777775 (1)
for  = 1   where the ¡ = [()],  = 1 2 3 4 are (4£4) matrices of parameters,
and the 's are mean zero innovations in output growths and uncertainty. This model
explains: the growth in actual output at time ¡1 (published in time  following the one-
quarter publication delay); the expected contemporaneous growth in output (published as
a nowcast in the survey dated at time ); the expected one-period ahead growth in output
(also published in the survey dated at time ); and the level of uncertainty surrounding
the contemporaneous output level.11
The model in (1) can be written in levels form
y = A0 +
+1X
=1
A y¡ + ",  = 1   (2)
where y = ( ¡1,  , 

+1, 

 )
0 , " = (1 2 3 4)0 = (1, 1+2, 1+2+3,
4)
0 and the A's are functions of the original ¡'s. Assuming actual and expected output
growths are stationary in (1), the A's will incorporate restrictions that ensure the shocks
" have a permanent e®ect on the three output level measures and that they move together
one-for-one in the long run.12 Shocks to the system, in the form of ", represent the news
arriving at  on output levels in  ¡ 1, , and  + 1 respectively and on uncertainty at .
These shocks capture the in°uence of news on future values of fundamentals emphasised in
the papers by Beaudry and Portier (2006), Barsky and Sims (2011, 2012) and Bachmann
and Sims (2012) discussed earlier. Equally though, given that the time series model is
agnostic on the nature of the shocks, (1) and (2) are also consistent with the possibility
11The use of direct measures of expectations means we can assume the information sets of economic
agents and the econometrician are the same, circumventing the problems of non-fundamentalness often
discussed in VAR analysis based on structural models involving expectations; see Leeper et al. (2013).
12Indeed the model can also be written in terms of ¢¡1, ¢ , ¢+1and  where the model
explicitly contains the (two) cointegrating vectors (1¡1 0 0) and (1 0¡1 0).
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that the " re°ect autonomous shifts in beliefs which might also cause permanent changes
in actual and expected outputs.
Note that the model of (1) and (2) treats news on uncertainty in the same way as news
on output levels. Policy announcements that generate uncertainty on domestic regulatory
or macroeconomic policy or events creating ambiguity on the world economic outlook
are re°ected in 4 and these will have permanent e®ects on actual and expected levels
of output. Our model therefore explicitly captures the `¯rst moment' e®ects of good or
bad news on economic prospects and the `second moment' e®ects of uncertainty shocks.
This is an advantage over models that use more generic sentiment or con¯dence indices
since those indices typically re°ect an amalgam of the ¯rst and second moment e®ects.
Having said this, the uncertainty shocks 4 will be correlated with news on output levels
1 2 and 3 and identifying restrictions need to be imposed if we want to separate out
any distinct e®ects from uncertainty shocks. For example, Bachmann et al. (2011) and
Baker et al. (2012) impose a Choleski ordering in which uncertainty is determined ¯rst so
that news on uncertainty at  in°uences time- measures of output but not vice versa. Of
course, any conclusions drawn on the relative importance of uncertainty shocks will only
be as robust as the identifying assumptions underlying them but the results will provide
a useful upper bound on the in°uence of uncertainty if the above Choleski ordering is
assumed.
The model in (1) and (2) makes no assumptions on the expectation formation process
or agents' use of information other than that expectational errors are stationary. This
is consistent with a full-information RE (FIRE) model or a RE model incorporating
information rigidities and, indeed, all these RE models are nested within the general form
at (1). For example, the assumption of FIRE means that
¡1 = ¡1¡1 + 1 and 

 = ¡1

 + 2 , (3)
so that expectational errors and revisions are orthogonal to past information. These
assumptions can be incorporated into (1) by the restrictions that 1(1 2) = 1 , 1(2 3) = 1
and all the other elements of the ¯rst two rows of the ¡ are zero. Equally, as described
by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the sticky information RE (SIRE) assumption is
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typically taken to mean that agents update their information each period with probability
(1 ¡ ), so that the reported average forecast of output at  +  ,  ¸ 0, consists of a
weighted average of the RE forecasts of + over the past; i.e. 

+ = (1 ¡ )
P1
=0 

¡+ where ¡

+ is the RE of + at  ¡ . This motivates a set of very speci¯c
relationships between expectational errors and revisions, including that13
¡1 ¡ ¡1¡1 =

1¡ ( ¡1

¡1 ¡ ¡2¡1) + 1 . (4)
This relationship can be accommodated within the model at (1), setting 1(1 1) = 1 ¡
1(1 2) , 1(1 1) = ¡2(1 2) and all the other elements of the ¯rst row of the ¡ to be
zero. Alternatively, again as elaborated by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the less
restrictive assumption of noisy information RE (NIRE) can be captured by imposing the
restrictions that expectational errors are a higher order function of lagged expectational
errors and revisions:
¡1 ¡ ¡1¡1 =
X
=1
£
1( ¡¡¡1 ¡ ¡¡1¡¡1) + 2(¡¡ ¡ ¡¡1¡)
¤
+ 1
(5)
which again translates to restrictions on the ¯rst two rows of the ¡.
Similar RE-consistent restrictions also apply to the uncertainty equation. For ex-
ample, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) note that disagreement between forecasters
should be independent of news on outputs in the NIRE case. This is because agents
here continuously update their forecasts so that the only source of disagreement relates
to idiosyncratic di®erences in information sets and there is no reason to believe these
change over the business cycle. The same is true for FIRE so both FIRE and NIRE imply
zero restrictions on the output terms in the fourth row of (1). In contrast, since only a
subset of agents update their information at any time under SIRE, disagreement between
survey respondents will vary systematically over the business cycle and no restrictions are
implied for the fourth row by SIRE.
13Other relationships include


+ ¡ ¡1+ =

1 ¡  ( ¡1

+ ¡ ¡2+ ) + 
for  ¸ 0. However, these rely on there being direct measure of expectations more than one period ahead
which we have not included in (1).
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It is worth noting that the absence of restrictions on the third row of the model even in
the most restrictive FIRE case still leaves scope for complex interactions between actual
and expected outputs in the underlying behavioural model of output. But the various
models incorporating the restrictions associated with NIRE, SIRE and FIRE provide
useful benchmarks to explain output dynamics in terms of fundamentals and information
rigidities. As described below, comparison of these benchmark models (and particularly
the least restrictive NIRE model) against the unrestricted model provides a means of
measuring the role of sentiment in output °uctuations.
2.2 Global interactions
The single-country model considered above is readily extended to accommodate cross-
country interactions following the GVAR approach outlined in, for example, Pesaran et
al (2004) and Garratt et al. (2006). In this, weighted averages of variables are used
to capture the e®ect of external in°uences in separate national VAR models and these
national models are then brought together in a single coherent VAR system. To see this,
and using an  subscript to denote country  = 1  , note ¯rst that the single-country
model in (1) can be extended to include global actual growth, 
¤
¡1 ¡¡1 ¤¡2 and the
corresponding global expected growths and global uncertainties. Here, 
¤
¡1 =
P
=1
¡1 is a measure of the `foreign' output level for country  obtained as a weighted
average of other countries' outputs using ¯xed weights  chosen to capture the in°uence
of country  on country  (using trade volumes or some other metric, for example). The
vector y contains foreign actual, nowcast and expected future outputs and uncertainty
de¯ned in the same way (i.e. as weighted average of the other countries' measures). The
national model in (2) can then be extended to include foreign growth and uncertainty and
be written as
y = B +
+1X
=1
B y¡ +
+1X
=0
B¤ y
¤
¡ + ",  = 1   and  = 1  
(6)
This model provides a straightforward means of accommodating global in°uences on a
country's output, now explicitly incorporating the e®ect of other countries' actual and
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expected levels of activity and uncertainty about these in addition to the e®ect of foreign
activity already captured in (2) through the country's own expectations measures.
The second stage in the construction of a GVAR explaining actual and expected out-
puts and uncertainty across the  countries is achieved by stacking the country-speci¯c
series into a single 4 £ 1 vector z = (y01,..,y0)0 and writing y¤ = wz where w is the
1£ 4 vector containing country 's weights. Arranging the individual vectors of parame-
ters B and B
¤
 into B and B
¤
 and the individual vectors of weights w intoW, the 
country-speci¯c models in (6) can be written
z = B+
+1X
=1
B z¡ +
+1X
=0
B¤ Wz¡ + ²,  = 1   (7)
where ² = ("
0
1,..,"
0
)
0 with variance-covariance matrix §. The errors ² abstract from
the in°uences on z arising from the global measures and, while in practice there might
be cross-country correlations in these innovations, § will be close to block diagonal and
these shocks can be thought of as nation-speci¯c ones (with o®-diagonals capturing within-
country correlations between innovations on the actual and expected outputs and uncer-
tainty). We can now write
z = (I¡B¤0W)¡1
Ã
B+
+1X
=1
(B +B
¤
W)z¡ + ²
!
,  = 1   (8)
or equivalently
z = ©+
+1X
=1
© z¡ + v,  = 1   (9)
where © = (I ¡ B¤0W)¡1B, © = (I ¡ B¤0W)¡1(B + B¤W) ,  = 1  + 1 and v =
(I¡B¤0W)¡1² with variance-covariance matrix -. The expressions in (8) and (9) provide
a GVAR model that explicitly captures all the interdependencies that exist between actual
and expected outputs and uncertainties in all  countries.
Of course, the assumption of rationality in expectations formation implies additional
restrictions, imposed on the global terms, when working with the GVAR. Speci¯cally,
FIRE requires the terms to enter only as contemporaneous revisions so that, for example,
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the expressions for ¡1 and  in (3) become
¡1 = ¡1¡1 + 0( 
¤
 ¡ ¡1¤) + 1( ¤¡1 ¡ ¡1¤¡1) + 1 ;
and 

 = ¡1

 + 2( 
¤
 ¡ ¡1¤) + 3( ¤¡1 ¡ ¡1¤¡1) + 2
These restrictions ensure that, when the countries are stacked and arranged in the GVAR,
revisions in each countries' output expectations are orthogonal to the information available
for all countries at time ¡1 as required by FIRE. As in the national case discussed earlier,
the assumption of SIRE weakens the restrictions, allowing time-(¡ 1) revisions of global
outputs to enter too, and NIRE allows still more °exibility in which all available revisions
on the national and global variables help explain time- revisions of ¡1 and .
2.3 Characterising and decomposing the system dynamics
The dynamic e®ects of di®erent types of shocks to the global VAR system are well charac-
terised by the `persistence pro¯les' [PP] proposed by Lee and Pesaran (1993). For these,
we can usefully rewrite (9) to obtain the in¯nite moving average form for ¢z
¢z = v +C1v¡1 +C2v¡2 +C3v¡3 + 
= C() v (10)
where C1 = ©1 ¡ I, and C = C¡1©1 +C¡2©2 +  +C¡¡1©+1 ,  = 2 3  with
C0 = I and C = 0,   0., and where these coe±cients are summarised in the lag
polynomial C() = I +C1 +C2
2 +C3
3 +  Clearly, shocks to the output growth
and uncertainty series in ¢z will have no e®ect on these series at the in¯nite horizon
given that they are stationary. But the shocks will cause output levels to be higher than
they would have been in the absence of the shock.14 Lee and Pesaran (1993) propose the
use of PP's to measure the long-run response of the levels series to shocks and to trace out
the time pro¯le of the accumulation of this response to characterise the system dynamics.
At time horizon , the PP's are de¯ned by the 4 £ 4 matrix P() whose ( )-th
14Uncertainty is assumed staionary in levels so innovations to the ¢ 

 are self-cancelling and shocks
have no e®ect on the level of uncertainty at the in¯nite horizon.
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element is given by
() =
e0H()
0eq
(e0C(0)-C(0)0e)(e
0
C(0)-C(0)
0e)
   = 1  4 (11)
where e is the 4 £ 1 selection vector with unity in its -th element and zeros elsewhere
and where H() =
³X
=0
C
´
-
³X
=0
C
´0
for  = 0 1 . Here, the H()
capture the size of the permanent e®ects of the shocks on output and uncertainty as they
accumulate over time up to period . As  ! 1, the P() converge to the `persistence
matrix' P whose ( )-th element is given by
 =
e0C(1)-C(1)
0eq
(e0C(0)-C(0)0e)(e
0
C(0)-C(0)
0e)
   = 1  4 (12)
This matrix provides a variance-based measure of the in¯nite-horizon e®ect of shocks to
the system. For output e®ects, it is most easily interpreted by considering the measures
 =
p
 based on its diagonal elements, where  = 1 5 9  4 ¡ 3 refer to the ¯rst
of the four rows relating to country . These measures show the size of the permanent
e®ect on actual output in county  of a shock to the system that causes output in that
country to rise by 1% on impact. In the univariate case, the measure coincides with
the "impulse-based" measure of persistence, describing the in¯nite horizon e®ect of a 1%
shock to the variable, and the two concepts are clearly related therefore. However, the
variance-based measure has the advantage that it does not require, and indeed is invariant
to, the identifying assumptions necessary to provide structural meaning to the shocks in
an impulse response analysis conducted in a multivariate setting (see Lee and Pesaran,
1993, for further discussion). Since the actual output, current expected output and future
expected output series are cointegrated, the corresponding rows of C(1) are equal in
each country capturing the fact that the persistent e®ect of shocks on the three country
variables is the same in the long run. The matrices P() ,  = 1 2 , describe the time-
pro¯le of the e®ect of these shocks over time re°ecting both the scaled e®ect of innovations
and the underlying dynamics of the actual and expected output and uncertainty series.
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2.3.1 Persistence decompositions: national versus global shocks and the role
of uncertainty
Two decompositions of these persistence pro¯les are of interest: one to consider the relative
importance and dynamic e®ects of national and global shocks; and a second that allows
us to consider the role of uncertainty shocks on output dynamics. For the ¯rst of these,
we note that the in°uence of global interactions in the model of (6) is captured through
the starred parameters since there would be no global shocks if B¤0 = 0 and no global
dynamics if B¤ = 0,  = 1   + 1. Writing (I ¡ B¤0W)¡1 = I +M¤, where M¤ =
B¤0W+(B
¤
0W)
2 + (B¤0W)
3 +  is the `global multiplier', (9) can be re-written as
z =
¡
©0 +©

0
¢
+
+1X
=1
(© +©

 )z¡ + v,  = 1   (13)
where © = B,  = 0   + 1 for notational convenience and where ©

0 = M
¤B0 and
© =M
¤B + (I+M¤)B¤,  = 1   + 1, collecting together all of the terms involving
cross-country interdependencies. We also have v = (I +M
¤)² with variance-covariance
matrix - = (I +M¤)§(I +M¤)0 so that the variance in v can be decomposed to write
- = -+- where - = §, - =M¤§(I+M¤)0 + §M¤0, and - and - capture the
relative sizes of the national and global shocks respectively.
The persistent e®ects of shocks can now be decomposed into national and global ele-
ments. This is seen by splitting the elements of C() in the moving average representation
of (10) into a national element C() and a global element C() where the former is
independent of the starred parameters and the latter captures the e®ects of the global
dynamics:
¢z = v + (C

1 +C

1 )v¡1 + (C

2 +C

2 )v¡2 + (C

3 +C

3 )v¡3 + ,  = 1  
(14)
Here C1 = ©

0 ¡ I, and C = C¡1©1 +C¡2©2 +  +C¡¡1©+1,  = 2 3  with
C0 = I and C

 = 0,   0, while C

 = C ¡ C ,  = 1 2 deriving the global
e®ects as the di®erence between the total and the national e®ects. The elements of the
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in¯nite-horizon persistence matrix in (12) can then be written as
 =
e0 [C
(1) +C(1)] (-+-) [C(1) +C(1)]0 eq
(e0C(0)-C(0)0e)(e
0
C(0)-C(0)
0e)
=  + 

   = 1   (15)
where  =
e0 C
 (1)-C (1)0 ep
(e0C(0)-C(0)0e)(e
0
C(0)-C(0)
0e)
provides a measure of the size of the e®ect of
national shocks, abstracting entirely from the e®ects of global interactions on impact and
from any global dynamics, and where  =  ¡  shows the overall contribution of
the global in°uences, again measured as the di®erence between the total persistence and
the national persistence measures. Clearly, the time pro¯le of the e®ects of shocks as
described in (11) can be decomposed into national and global components in a similar
way.
The persistence measures of (11) and (12) can also be decomposed in a way to exam-
ine the persistent e®ect of uncertainty shocks. Generally, the shocks to the uncertainty
equations in (7), 4, have the same sort of persistent e®ects on output levels as news on
the outputs themselves - i.e. the 1, 2 and 3 - although no structural interpretation
can be given to these given the correlations that exist between the series. If, however, we
assume a time-ordering of the shocks, so that survey respondents' views on outputs are
formed with the uncertainty of the decision-making environment already given, then we
can identify the e®ects of the uncertainty shocks. In this case, we can separate out the
uncertainty shocks - denoted by ± = (4 8, ..., 28)
0 - from the shocks to the GVAR
in (7) by regressing v on ± and writing v = D± + ev. In this case, (10) can be written
in terms of uncertainty shocks and `other', unidenti¯ed shocks ev to give
¢z = C()
£
D± + ev¤
= D()± +C()ev
and the numerator of the persistence measures in (11) can be decomposed as
e0C(1)-C(1)
0e = e0C(1)
he-+DªD0iC(1)0e
= e0C(1)e-C(1)0e + e0D(1)ªD(1)0e (16)
where e- and ª are the variance-covariance matrices of ev and ± respectively. Dividing
throughout by the denominator of (11), we decompose the e®ects of a shock that causes
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output to rise by 1% on impact into that part due to uncertainty shocks () and `the
remainder' due to economic prospects (). This decomposition assigns the maximum
possible e®ect to the uncertainty shocks so that the persistence measures obtained with
this time-ordering assumption provide a useful upper bound on the measure of the e®ect
of uncertainty.
2.3.2 Persistence allocation: the role of fundamentals versus sentiment
The persistence measures of (11) and (12) can also be used to measure the relative impor-
tance of fundamentals versus sentiment in output °uctuations if we assume that output
movements and variations in uncertainty due to fundamentals are consistent with RE. In
the FIRE case, for example, the restrictions of (10) and the assumption that uncertainty
does not vary systematically over the business cycle means that the B and B
¤
 in (6)
would take the form
B1 =
26666664
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
0 0 0 ¤
37777775  B

(1 : 3 ) =
26666664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
0 0 0 ¤
37777775 for  = 2  + 1
B¤0 =
26666664
1 0 0 0
3 2 0 0
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
0 0 0 0
37777775  B
¤
1 =
26666664
0 ¡1 ¡0 0
0 ¡3 ¡2 0
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
0 0 0 ¤
37777775  B
¤
 =
26666664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
0 0 0 ¤
37777775 for  = 1
where the  superscript denotes that the FIRE restrictions have been imposed. These
restrictions ensures that expectational errors in each country are orthogonal to past infor-
mation at home and abroad, with uncertainty independent of the business cycle and evolv-
ing according to past uncertainty only. We can separate out the contribution to output
°uctuations of the RE-fundamental e®ects from the remainder by writing B = B

 +B


 = 0  + 1 We then note that (9) can be re-written as
z =
¡
© +©
¢
+
+1X
=1
(© +©

 )z¡ + v,  = 1   (18)
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where © = (I¡B¤0 W)¡1B, and © = (I+B¤0 W)¡1(B +B¤ W) and © = © ¡©
for  = 1   + 1 The permanent e®ects of shocks to output associated with RE-
fundamentals can then be distinguished from those associated with sentiment following
a similar method to that outlined in (14) and (15) treating the fundamental element in
(18) in the same way the national e®ects were treated in (13). The di®erence here is
that, rather than decomposing the variance using the estimated parameters as in (14), in
(18) we are `allocating' the variance to fundamentals and sentiment according to a set of
imposed restrictions. Since we are simply imposing coe±cients, the variation associated
with the separate elements could, in principle, take arbitrarily large values with the o®-
setting covariance ensuring the overall persistence in the unrestricted model is unchanged.
In these circumstances, the variance allocation conveys the relative importance of funda-
mentals versus sentiment and this is captured by the ratio of the persistence measures
(with the covariance unallocated to either).15
3 Modelling Output Fluctuations in the G7, 1994q1-2014q2
The empirical work of the paper uses actual and expected output data for the G7 economies
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) observed
over the period 1994q1-2014q2.16 The expectations data for each country are taken from
issues of Consensus Forecasts: A Digest of International Economic Forecasts. The surveys
are published monthly by Consensus Economics and contain compilations of countries'
economic forecasts produced by various public and private institutions (including invest-
ment banks, research institutes and so on).17 Our quarterly measures of expected output
are based on the mean forecasts delivered by the survey respondents mid-way through the
quarter in March, June, September and December, while our uncertainty measure refers
15In the national-global decomposition, the covariance was implicitly allocated to the global measures
as the covariance would be zero in the absence of global e®ects.
16The sample period is dictated by the availability of expectations data in a consistent form for all the
G7 economies.
17It could be argued that professional forecasters' expectations do not re°ect those of a typical economic
agent. But even if professional forecasters are `unsentimental' themselves, for example, they may have an
incentive to report expectations that match their clients' sentiments.
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to the inter-quartile range of the individuals' responses. In quarter , Consensus Forecasts
provides data on growth in GDP in country  expected for the year to the current quarter
(i.e. a measure of e¡ e¡4 where the superscriptedenotes that the measure is from
the Consensus Forecasts) and on expected growth in the year to the next quarter (i.e. a
measure of e+1¡ e¡3). The uncertainty measure  is based on the disagreement
across respondents on contemporaneous growth e¡ e¡4.18
The actual output data employed in our analysis is the real volume GDP index for
each country taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics 2014q2. This pro-
vides a ¯nal vintage measure of output and its use means we abstract from the e®ects of
data revisions and focus on the role of the international interactions and survey expec-
tations data in our analysis.19 We construct the corresponding series of expected output
levels data for each country using the ¯nal vintage series with the Consensus Forecasts
of growth in a straightforward way: for example, we construct our measure of expected
contemporaneous output 

 = e¡ e¡4+ ¡4. Implicitly, our measure of the ¯rst
release of the actual output series ¡1 is taken to be the same as the ¯nal vintage ¡1
assuming that there are no revisions between  and the end of the sample period. We
e®ectively assume that the `true' actual output series is released with a one quarter delay,
that individuals know the true value of output up to one quarter previously and that it is
their expectations of growth in the true output series that is reported in the surveys. The
weights  used in the construction of country 's global variables are given by the total
trade between countries  and  in 2005 expressed as a fraction of all of 's trade across
the G7, as reported in the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics.
The actual output, expected current output and expected future output series are
plotted for each country in Figure 1a and the mean and standard deviation of the growths
of the series reported in Table 1. The plots show that the expected series typically track the
actual series quite closely but there are periods where the series diverge by a considerable
18See Dovern et al. (2012) for more detailed description of how we construct our uncertainty measure
based on Consensus Economics data.
19This is not to underplay the potential importance of revisions in the real time analysis of business
cycles; see Orphanides and van Norden (2002) and Garratt et al. (2008, 2009) for detailed discussion of
the e®ects of revisions on measures of the output gap for example.
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margin. The onset of the ¯nancial crisis in late 2007/early 2008 provides a good example
in most countries where the plots show that the full extent of the downturn is only slowly
incorporated into the survey nowcasts of current growth.20 Across the sample period,
the (annualised value of the) mean actual quarterly growth rate varies from 0.83% in
Italy to 2.62% in Canada but it is clear that there is considerable volatility in growths
across all countries, with one standard deviation of the actual quarterly rate ranging from
2.19% in France up to 4.28% in Japan. There are di®erences between the means of the
actual and expected growth series within each country, but these are small relative to
the overall volatility of the series so there is no reason to doubt the reasonableness of the
survey data on these grounds. The standard deviation of the expected growth series are,
in almost every case, smaller than the standard deviation of actual growth which shows
a conservatism in expectations formation which is entirely in line with most reasonable
assumptions on the expectation formation process.21
The uncertainty measures are plotted in Figure 1b. These also show considerable vari-
ability over time and demonstrate that there are no straightforward patterns in the series
over the business cycle: the correlations between each country's uncertainty measure and
its contemporaneous growth are not signi¯cantly di®erent to zero in any country and they
average at just -0.02 across the seven countries. Table 1b provides some summary sta-
tistics to describe the cross-country interactions between output growth and uncertainty
based on pairwise correlations between a country's uncertainty and growth experiences
and those of the other countries of the G7. Column (2), headed `Growth-Uncertainty',
reinforces the individual country observation that there almost no signi¯cant correlations
between output growth in a country and uncertainty elsewhere in the G7. But column (3),
headed `Uncertainty-Uncertainty', shows there is good evidence of common cross-country
movements in the uncertainty measures, with most of the underlying pairwise correlations
between uncertainty measures taking values in the range 0.25-0.35 (and only correlations
20In the U.S., for example, while quarterly growth actually fell by 0.44% in 2008q1, real time nowcasts
of growth still reported +0.25% growth.
21With rational expectations, for example, the variance in actual growth is equal to the sum of the
variances of expected and unexpected growths, and the variance in actual growth always exceeds the
variance of expected growth therefore.
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involving uncertainty in Italy and the UK lacking signi¯cance). These correlations are of
a similar order of magnitude to the underlying correlations between countries' growths
reported in column (1). The fact that both uncertainty and growth in most country
are contemporaneously related to uncertainty and growth experiences elsewhere, while
the relationships between output growths and uncertainty at home and abroad are less
straightforward, suggests that the global dimension of our GVAR model will play an
important part in our characterisation of output dynamics.
3.1 The GVAR model
A preliminary data analysis showed that the (logarithm of the) actual output data are
integrated of order 1 (i.e. the series needs to be di®erenced - once - in order to achieve
stationarity) while our uncertainty measures are stationary without transformation. It
also showed that the expectational errors ¡1¡ ¡1¡1 and revisions in expectations


¡ ¡1 are stationary. This ensures that the modelling framework set out in (1) is
appropriate.22
The empirical analysis is based around the four equation VARs,26666664
¡1 ¡ ¡1¡2


 ¡ ¡1


+1 ¡ 



37777775 = ¡0 +
2X
=1
¡
26666664
¡¡1¡ ¡ ¡1¡¡2¡
¡¡ ¡ ¡¡1¡
¡+1¡ ¡ ¡¡
¡¡
37777775
+
2X
=0
¡¤
26666664
¡¤¡1¡ ¡ ¡1¡¤¡2¡
¡¤¡ ¡ ¡¤¡1¡
¡¤+1¡ ¡ ¡¤¡
¡¤¡
37777775+ ± 081 +
26666664
1
2
3
4
37777775 (19)
for  = 1  7  = 19941 20142 including an intercept, two lags of each of the three
national growth and uncertainty series plus the contemporaneous value and two lags of
the corresponding global growth series. Given the impact of the ¯nancial crisis on growth,
22We conducted standard ADF tests and, following Pesaran (2007), cross-sectionally augmented DF
tests where the underlying regressions are augmented by lags in the cross-section average to account for
cross-sectional interdependencies. Details are available on request.
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we also included a simple time dummy to accommodate outlying observations in 2008q1.
The estimated equations perform well in explaining the series with 2 averaging across
the seven countries at 055, 052 and 061 in the three output equations and 050 in the
uncertainty equations. In the output equations, the results demonstrate that the model is
able to capture very complex dynamics with important feedbacks from national and global
variables and from actual and expected output and uncertainty variables across all the
equations.23 The equations explaining uncertainty are simpler in that they contain fewer
signi¯cant explanatory variables, with important dynamics and cross-country interactions
across uncertainty measures but relatively weak feedback from the growth series. The
consequences of this complexity are illustrated in the persistence measures and pro¯les
below.
Before turning to the persistence measures though, Table 2 provides some test results
investigating the rationality of expectations formation. The ¯rst three columns show,
respectively: the test of the restriction implied by FIRE and imposed on the actual out-
put growth equation embedded within the SIRE model (implying agents update their
information every period); the test of the restriction implied by SIRE and imposed on
the NIRE model (implying only one lagged revision is required to capture information
rigidities); and the test of the restrictions implied by NIRE and imposed on the unre-
stricted quasi-di®erence model of (19). The results show that, if one were to start with
a simple NIRE model, the restrictions implied by SIRE and FIRE would not be rejected
in most countries. But the restrictions imposed to achieve NIRE from (19) are strongly
rejected across all countries, showing that there is signi¯cant explanatory power for actual
output in the lagged actual and expected growth and uncertainty series over and above
that captured by output revisions alone. The column headed `Uncertainty' reports the
corresponding tests for rationality in the uncertainty equations. Both FIRE and NIRE
assert that uncertainty will not vary systematically over the business cycle and the results
reported here show that there are indeed no signi¯cant feedbacks from output growth to
23As noted following (7), the shocks to the model can be considered nation-speci¯c if the variance-
covariance matrix § is block-diagonal. A Box M test con¯rmed this to be the case here with the 2
statistic having a p-value of 0.83.
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uncertainty in any country. On the other hand, given that we relate fundamentals to the
models incorporating rationality (with or without information restrictions), the results
from the output growth equations show that there is certainly scope for `sentiment' to ex-
plain output °uctuations. The quantitative importance of sentiment on persistent output
movements is measured by the persistence statistics below.
3.2 The persistent e®ects of shocks to G7 output
Table 3 describes the persistence measures de¯ned in equations (12), (15) and (16) based
on our GVAR model.24 The average of the countries' total persistence measures  is
2.47 meaning that, on average, a shock that causes output in a country to rise by 1% on
impact results in output being 2.47% higher in the long run than it would have been in
the absence of the shock. This observation obscures the di®erences found across countries
though, since the total persistence measures vary from 1.04 in Japan - so that the shock
has almost the same e®ect in the long-run as it does on impact - to 3.29 in Canada.
The plots of Figure 2 give a sense of the output dynamics that underlie these results.
Figure 2a shows the persistence pro¯le of the shocks to actual, nowcast and expected
future outputs taking the countries of the G7 as a whole and gives a useful summary of
the system dynamics and interplay between the output series.25 As we see, news that
raises actual output ¡1 by 1% on impact has a corresponding one-for-one e®ect on the
nowcast 

 and an expectation of a further rise in the subsequent quarters (

+1 rising by
just under 2% on impact for example). After some short-run volatility, the pro¯les then
broadly track each other with a one period delay26 although they show that the e®ects of
the shock take some considerable time to work through, with the total persistence measure
24With 21 parameters estimated in each of the 28 estimated equations, the unrestricted GVAR model
described above is highly parameterised. The results below therefore relate to a simpli¯ed version of
the GVAR model obtained through a speci¯cation search in which coe±cients are set to zero where the
(absolute value of the) t-ratio is less 1.64.
25The G7 persistence measures are calculated replacing the selection vectors e and e in (12), (15)
and (16) with a 1 £ 7 vector of ones.
26Note that these series track each other closely but are not exact horizontal displacements of each
other as they would be under FIRE. The (relatively minor) extent to which they di®er from this though
gives an indication of the (relatively minor) quantitative importance of the deviations from rationality.
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levelling out to their in¯nite horizon value only after four or ¯ve years. Figure 2b plots the
underlying pro¯les for the individual countries' actual outputs, showing the variability in
persistence across countries but reinforcing the idea of a protracted period of adjustment.
Of course, the fact that the prolonged period of adjustment is similar across countries
shows that cross-country interactions play a substantial role in output dynamics.
The global-versus-national and prospects-versus-uncertainty decompositions
Table 3 also quanti¯es the importance of these cross-country in°uences by reporting the
decomposition of the persistence measures into national and global e®ects as described at
(15). On average, around 50% of the persistent e®ects of shocks is associated with national
innovations and their propagation over time and 50% of the persistent e®ect involves
global shocks and cross-country propagation mechanisms. Again though, these average
statistics obscure some considerable di®erences between countries. Nation-speci¯c shocks
and national dynamics are observed to be more important than global shocks in Germany
and Japan and close to 50% in the U.S., re°ecting these countries' relative autonomy,
while Canada, France, Italy and U.K. are found to be more sensitive to outside events. It
is interesting to note that these ¯gures are broadly in line with those of Crucini et al (2011)
mentioned earlier (¯nding that global factors account for around 46% of output variation
but ranging from 15% in the US to 80% in France) even though the modelling approach
and the associated measures of national-versus-global contributions are very di®erent.
The table also provides insights on the sources of persistent shocks applying the
Choleski ordering discussed earlier in which uncertainty shocks are assumed to occur ¯rst
in order to distinguish their e®ects from those of `other' unidenti¯ed shocks. This further
decomposition shows that, on average across the seven countries, uncertainty accounts for
22% of the total, in¯nite-horizon persistence measures. This is a non-negligible source of
shocks although the ¯gure is lower than in some of the recent empirical work aimed at
quantifying the e®ects of uncertainty. Most strikingly, it is the global uncertainty rather
than the own-country uncertainty that is found to drive the uncertainty e®ects that exist,
explaining 17% of the 22% on average and with uncertainty e®ects showing most clearly
in those countries we found to be most sensitive to outside events generally.
23
Figure 3 provides a further insight on the role of uncertainty plotting the persistence
pro¯le of actual output across the G7 from our model (as in Figure 2a earlier) but plotting
also the equivalent pro¯le obtained from a model which drops the uncertainty variables
from the GVAR altogether. This shows that the overall, in¯nite-horizon persistent e®ect
of shocks on actual output are very similar in the two models.(with  averaging 280 in
the model without uncertainty compared to the earlier 247). But the dynamics of the
two are very di®erent with 95% of the adjustment completed in around two years in the
absence of uncertainty, compared to ¯ve years in the full model. While uncertainty does
not play a major role in terms of the source of persistent shocks to output then, it appears
that it plays a very signi¯cant role in the propagation of their e®ects, more than doubling
the duration of the adjustment period following shocks.
The fundamentals-versus-sentiment allocation Finally, Table 4 presents the re-
sults of the analysis aiming to quantify the relative importance of fundamentals-versus-
sentiment in the persistence measures. The results relate to the same estimated GVAR
system described in Tables 2 and 3, so that the total persistence measures are unchanged,
but the total is allocated according to the consistency with rationality restrictions. The
formal test results of Table 2 show that none of the FIRE, SIRE or NIRE restrictions are
consistent with the data and so Table 4 considers the allocation according to NIRE which
involves the fewest restrictions compatible with rationality, at least as far as the output
equation is concerned. Of course, the NIRE also implies restrictions on the uncertainty
equations too and so the measures  and 

 in Table 4 show the persistence allocated
to the elements relating to fundamentals and sentiment respectively, as described at (18),
having imposed the NIRE restrictions, ¯rst based on the full model and then based on
the model without uncertainty.
The results show that, while fundamentals dominate in most countries, sentiment also
plays a non-negligible role in the persistent movements in output in the G7. The NIRE
allocation of persistence puts the in°uence of fundamentals to sentiment at 69 : 31 on
average in the full model and 75 : 25 in the model without uncertainty. Japan is an
outlier in both cases and the ratios are 76 : 24 and 80 : 20 if Japan is excluded. This
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means that, despite the strong rejection of the NIRE restrictions, the persistence allocation
measures show fundamentals to exert by far the largest part of the in°uence on outputs.
On the other hand, even a 20% role for sentiment in explaining the persistent movements
in output levels in the G7 is striking and indicates that policy-makers could usefully take
such e®ects into account in their decisions.
4 Concluding remarks
This GVAR model described in the paper provides a straightforward time series char-
acterisation of actual and expected output movements and uncertainty across the G7
economies over the last twenty years. Together with the new measures proposed in the
paper, the results provide some interesting insights on recent experiences in the G7 coun-
tries. For example, the estimated persistence pro¯les demonstrate that the e®ects of the
¯rst shocks of the ¯nancial crisis experienced at the end of 2007 would have still been felt
some 5 years later in 2012 and the full implications of the subsequent reactions are likely
to continue to be felt for some years. Further, even in those countries which are found to
be relatively autonomous (U.S., Germany, Japan), a large part of this protracted period
of adjustment results from the complex cross-country interactions that exist within the
G7. While there are some di®erences across countries, on average 50% of the persistent
e®ect of shocks on outputs across the G7 are found to involve globally-sourced shocks
or global dynamics and it is clear that international agencies and coordinated actions by
national policy makers will play an important role in mitigating the worst e®ects of global
recessions and encouraging stable growth.
Cross-country interactions are also important in our ¯ndings on uncertainty which is
found to provide a non-negligible source of persistent shocks in many countries. Averaging
at around 20% across the countries, the e®ect on outputs is smaller than that found
elsewhere in the literature but is founded primarily in global interactions, highlighting
the role of doubts and ambiguities on trade opportunities and cross-border investments in
initiating and prolonging recessions. Indeed, uncertainty appears to play a key role in the
propagation mechanism for all shocks, explaining up to half of the ¯ve year adjustment
period noted above.
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Finally, our results show that there has also been an autonomous role for agents'
beliefs in propagating the e®ects of the ¯nancial crisis over the years over and above
the interaction of countries' fundamentals. Cutting across the analysis of the role of
national-versus-global shocks and prospects-versus-uncertainty, our measure shows that
sentiment explains around 20% of the permanent e®ects of shocks to output on average.
Persistent output movements are clearly dominated by fundamentals then but sentiment
is not inconsequential, highlighting the potential importance of psychological factors and
the gaps between belief and reality for understanding output dynamics and formulating
policy.
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics for Actual and Expected Output Growth,
1994q1-2014q2
Actual
+1¡ ¡1
Expected Current


¡ ¡1
Expected Future
¡1¡ ¡1¡1
Mean (%) St. Dev (%) Mean (%) St. Dev (%) Mean (%) St. Dev (%)
Canada 2.62 2.26 1.68 2.52 2.85 1.40
France 1.58 2.19 1.34 2.26 1.92 1.73
Germany 1.40 3.42 1.08 2.82 1.86 1.83
Italy 0.83 3.36 0.31 2.88 1.77 2.49
Japan 0.96 4.28 0.95 4.28 1.35 3.12
United Kingdom 2.15 2.52 0.91 3.54 2.33 2.04
United States 2.48 2.59 2.96 2.47 2.28 1.98
Notes: Summary statistics relate to the mean and standard deviation of the actual growth,
current expected growth, and expected future growth series for growth  ¡ ¡1 measured for
 = 19941¡ 20142 expressed as an annualised percentage rate.
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Table 1b: Summary Statistics for Cross-Country Growths and Uncertainty,
1994q1-2014q2
(1)
Growth, Growth
(2)
Growth, Uncertainty
(3)
Uncertainty, Uncertainty
Corr. (Sig.) Corr (Sig.) Corr (Sig.)
Canada 015 (36) ¡016 (27) 041 (56)
France 010 (06) 011 (17) 035 (46)
Germany 011 (26) ¡007 (17) 026 (46)
Italy 001 (06) 007 (07) 010 (16)
Japan 010 (26) ¡016 (37) 033 (46)
United Kingdom 002 (06) ¡006 (07) 018 (26)
United States 001 (16) ¡010 (27) 030 (46)
Notes: `Growth-Growth' shows, for country , the correlation between expected contempora-
neous growths, 

¡ ¡1 and ¡ ¡1 averaged across  6= ; `Growth-Uncertainty'
shows, for country , the correlation between expected contemporaneous growth 

¡ ¡1
and uncertainty 

 averaged across all ; and Uncertainty-Uncertainty' shows, for country ,
the correlation between expected uncertainties, 

 and 

 averaged across  6= . Figures
under `Sig.' show the number of countries for which the correlation is signi¯cant at 5% level
(i.e. 0.22).
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Table 2: Tests of RE Parameter Restrictions in the VAR Model
Actual Output Growth Uncertainty
FIRE[1] SIRE[1] NIRE[15] FIRE/NIRE[15]
Canada 118
(028)
056
(048)
1410yyy
(000)
137
(019)
France 043
(051)
061
(044)
1799yyy
(000)
102
(045)
Germany 194
(017)
001
(092)
71yyy
(000)
143
(017)
Italy 499yy
(003)
012
(073)
1077yyy
(000)
138
(019)
Japan 088
(035)
014
(071)
690yyy
(000)
149
(014)
UK 035
(055)
137
(025)
4066yyy
(000)
076
(071)
US 012
(073)
136
(024)
1113yyy
(000)
092
(055)
Notes: The table reports  -test statistics of restrictions on the actual output growth and un-
certainty equations of the VAR at (19) as described at (10) and in the text. For the growth
equations, `' tests the restrictions imposed on the unrestricted quasi-di®erence equations
to achieve NIRE; `' tests the additional restrictions to achieve SIRE; and `' tests
the additional restrictions to achieve FIRE. For the uncertainty equations, `'
tests the restrictions imposed on the unrestricted quasi-di®erence equations to achieve FIRE
and NIRE. The number of restrictions is in [.]. Figures in (.) are p-values and the `y', `yy' and
`yyy' denotes signi¯cance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level.
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Table 3: Persistence Measures at the In¯nite Horizon and their
Decomposition into National/Global and Prospects/Uncertainty
Components
National
Prospects j Uncertainty
Global
Prospects j Uncertainty
Total
Prospects j Uncertainty
 

 
 

 

 

 

 


Canada 119
36%
(034) 210
64%
(179) 329 (161)
114
35%
004
1%
187
57%
024
7%
301
92%
028
8%
France 084
26%
(012) 237
74%
(047) 321 (039)
074
23%
007
3%
135
42%
105
32%
209
65%
111
35%
Germany 121
65%
(013) 066
35%
(040) 186 (031)
107
57%
017
8%
053
28%
010
7%
159
85%
027
15%
Italy 089
40%
(011) 135
60%
(053) 224 (046)
082
37%
006
3%
050
22%
086
38%
132
59%
092
41%
Japan 100
96%
(007) 004
4%
(012) 104 (006)
089
85%
011
11%
008
8%
¡004
¡4%
097
93%
007
7%
United Kingdom 081
34%
(012) 150
66%
(039) 239 (029)
079
33%
002
1%
079
33%
079
33%
157
66%
081
34%
United States 172
53%
(015) 156
47%
(090) 328 (080)
155
47%
023
7%
143
44%
008
2%
298
91%
030
9%
Notes: The  show the in¯nite horizon persistent e®ect on output in country  of a shock to
actual and expected outputs and uncertainty in all countries which cause output in country 
to rise by 1% on impact. The  and 

 show the decomposition into the national and global
elements respectively as de¯ned at (15) in the text; the  and 

 show the decomposition
into that part due to prospects and that part due to uncertainty as de¯ned in the text. The
% ¯gures express the elements as a proportion of total persistence. The ¯gures in (.) show
estimated standard errors.
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Table 4: Persistence Measures at the In¯nite Horizon and their Allocation
into Fundamentals/Sentiment Components
(Full Model and Model excluding uncertainty)
Fundamentals

Sentiment

Total

Canada 85% 15% 329 (161)
55% 45% 326 (162)
France 99% 1% 321 (039)
99% 1% 224 (039)
Germany 43% 57% 186 (031)
53% 47% 152 (031)
Italy 96% 4% 224 (046)
99% 1% 293 (046)
Japan 22% 78% 104 (006)
50% 50% 119 (006)
United Kingdom 55% 45% 239 (029)
89% 11% 206 (029)
United States 83% 17% 328 (080)
76% 24% 182 (061)
Notes: The `Total'  show the in¯nite horizon persistent e®ect on output in country  of shocks
to all countries' actual and expected outputs which cause output in country  to rise by 1%
on impact. The two rows for each country relate to the model with and without uncertainty
respectively. The  and 

 show the decomposition into the elements relating to fundamentals
and sentiment respectively as described in the text at (18), and reports the respective ¯gures
according to the imposition of the noisy information restrictions ().
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Figure 1a: Actual, Nowcast and One-Period-Ahead Expected Outputs 
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 Figure 1b: Interquartile Range (Uncertainty) and Output Growth 
 
         
 
 
 
   
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
   
 
     
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
         
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Figure 2a: Persistence Profiles (PP) G7 Actual, Nowcast and One-Period-Ahead 
Expected Outputs (with uncertainty)  
         
          
          
          Figure 2b: PP of G7 Individual Countries Output (with uncertainty)
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Figure 3: PP of G7 Output with and without uncertainty 
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